Sankey, Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science by Ambrosio, Chiara
BOOK REVIEWS 
 
Theoria 66 (2009): 357-372 
370
HOWARD SANKEY, Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science. Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2008.  
In this edited collection of essays written between 1995 and 2006, Howard Sankey ar-
ticulates his defence of a scientific realist approach to the philosophy of science. The 
book sums up Sankey’s long-standing contribution to the field and shows the rele-
vance of realist themes to a number of open problems in the philosophy of science.  
 According to scientific realism, the way the world is does not depend on our be-
liefs about it. The existence of a mind-independent world is a core-tenet of the scien-
tific realist, who faces the task of explaining how genuine and reliable knowledge of a 
mind-independent reality is possible at all. Thus framed, scientific realism appears to 
be “a decidedly unpopular and poorly understood position, all too easily dismissed as 
a naïve doctrine subject to decisive objections” (1). For one thing, naïve realism seems 
to endorse a separation between epistemology and ontology. Yet, philosophers em-
bracing a realist stance also defend a position of epistemic optimism toward the possi-
bility of gaining knowledge of a mind-independent reality, at both observable and un-
observable levels. In rejoining epistemology and ontology, Sankey’s philosophical pro-
ject shows that a thorough elaboration of realism discloses novel paths of inquiry into 
the nature of scientific knowledge and the very aim of science. 
 The first two chapters survey and evaluate the family of doctrines at the core of 
scientific realism and offer a realist response to a range of anti-realist critiques. In 
chapter 1, Sankey assesses the theoretical and methodological implications of the 
claim that realism offers the best explanation for the success of science. On a theoreti-
cal level, he maintains that the predictive power of science is explained by the truth or 
approximate truth of scientific theories. This is a common argument among scientific 
realists and it appeals to a concept of truth as correspondence between scientists’ 
claims about the world and the way the world is. At a methodological level, Sankey 
proposes abductive realism as an account of how rules of method, considered as truth-
conducive cognitive instruments, provide scientists with epistemic warrant for choos-
ing among theories: “According to abductive realism, the best explanation for the suc-
cess of science is that the rules of method are regulative norms which ‘screen for 
truth’. They are genuinely truth-conducive instruments of inquiry, which rigorously se-
lect only those theories which are either true, or on the track of truth” (29).  
 In chapter 2, Sankey refutes the criticism that scientific realism requires an exter-
nalist “God’s Eye” perspective. He does so in a naturalist fashion, by presenting real-
ism as a hypothesis on the empirical success of science that should be evaluated 
analogously to scientific hypotheses. Such a naturalistic position does away with a 
God’s Eye viewpoint to justify the relation between science and reality. Yet, Sankey 
claims that an externalist perspective is not necessarily detrimental to realism, as 
shown by the case of animal cognition. Drawing on Hilary Kornblith’s Knowledge and its 
Place in Nature, (2002), he argues that scientists investigating the epistemic relations 
that animals establish with their environment ultimately adopt an externalist viewpoint 
that is not that of a god-like being. In a similar fashion, it is possible to adopt an ex-
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ternalist perspective to study human epistemic states without implying a God’s Eye 
view. 
 In chapter 3, Sankey distances himself from entity realism, which downplays truth 
in favour of an ontological commitment to the status of theoretical entities. By focus-
ing on the mind-independent existence of theoretical entities rather than the truth of 
theoretical claims, entity realism is a non-semantic version of realism. Yet, according 
to Sankey, the question arises whether this constitutes a valid alternative to truth-
oriented formulations of scientific realism. In his defence of semantic realism, Sankey 
seems to overlook the experimentalist character of entity realism. Rather than evading 
semantic questions, entity realism re-frames the issue by shifting the focus from scien-
tific theories to scientific practice. In doing so, it departs from the philosopher’s con-
cern about the truth of theories and adopts the experimenter’s viewpoint, whereby 
unobservable entities are real because their manipulation produces new phenomena 
and novel knowledge about the world.  
 In chapter 4, Sankey addresses the problem of semantic incommensurability. This 
aspect of incommensurability entails that translation failure due to meaning variance 
across subsequent scientific theories limits their comparison for evaluative purposes. 
Meaning variance raises questions about the continuity of reference and thus poses 
some fundamental difficulties to the scientific realist. Sankey proposes a modified ac-
count of the causal theory of reference to preserve the possibility of referential com-
parison despite translation failure. By incorporating descriptivism into a causal ac-
count of reference ― a move that Saul Kripke himself explicitly endorsed in Naming 
and Necessity ― he accounts for reference to unobservable theoretical entities, which 
must incorporate descriptions of the causal mechanisms whereby unobservable refer-
ents produce observable phenomena. While resolving the problem of reference failure 
in the case of theoretical entities, causal descriptivism still does not seem to offer a sat-
isfactory answer to the problem of reference change. Sankey suggests to supplement it 
with a realist account of post-baptismal uses, which supports the rationality of theory 
choice while retaining the philosophical insights deriving from the concept of incom-
mensurability. Despite the fact that reference is not inalterably fixed through the 
original (ostensive and/or descriptive) act of dubbing, it never shifts in a wholesale 
fashion. Instead, according to Sankey, “reference changes in a piecemeal manner, de-
pendent on the facts relating to the use of a given term” (69). This grants its stability 
in spite of the alterations of the descriptive content of terms.  
 In the second part of the book, Sankey departs from semantic concerns to focus 
on epistemological and methodological questions. In chapter 5, he draws on a combi-
nation of scientific realism, essentialism about natural kinds and epistemic naturalism 
to approach the problem of induction. Sankey suggests that a realist epistemology of-
fers an anti-sceptical answer to the traditional rejection of the principle of uniformity 
of nature. He reformulates the principle by grounding it in the essential properties of 
natural kinds ― essential properties being “fundamental causal capacities of members 
of natural kinds” (83). His response to the Humean sceptic is therefore that induction 
can be rationally justified by appealing to the uniformity of nature, and specifically to 
the common sets of properties shared by the members of natural kinds.  
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 A methodological question faced by the realist is how to combine the aim of truth 
with a pluralistic conception of scientific methodology. Sankey approaches the prob-
lem in chapter 6. Contrary to the view that realism and pluralism are antithetical posi-
tions, he argues that methodological pluralism does indeed advance the aim of truth. 
Sankey draws on Larry Laudan’s normative naturalism, which counters relativism by 
regarding rules of method instrumentally, as hypothetical imperatives relating cogni-
tive means and ends. Yet, where Laudan sees truth as epistemically utopian, Sankey 
characterizes it as a “regulative ideal” (103) which advances the fallible and yet truth-
conducive character of science.  
 The relation between method and truth is further explored by Sankey in chapters 7 
and 8. In chapter 7, he revisits abductive realism and argues that what best explains 
the success of science is that its truth-conducive methods are reliable means to attain 
convergence on truth. His argument revolves around the assumption that the relation 
between truth and method is an empirical and contingent one, which rests on abduc-
tive grounds. More importantly, Sankey emphasizes the truth-conduciveness of rules 
of method rather than the approximate truth of theories: it is an increasing level of 
satisfaction of rules of method that makes theories approximately true, and this is be-
cause rules of method, rather than theories, “screen for truth” (119).  
 In the final chapter, Sankey stresses the need of supporting the epistemology of re-
alism with ontology, as epistemological arguments for the success of science require 
an ontological explanation of what makes the world accessible to its truth-conducive 
methods. In doing this, he appeals to Nicholas Rescher’s methodological pragmatism, 
which identifies the truth-indicative character of rules of method with their successful 
practical applications. Incidentally, this lends further support to his claims on the 
truth-conducive nature of rules of method: indeed, the idea of pragmatically successful 
but systematically erroneous methods of inquiry would be a quite implausible one ― 
and it is in this sense that scientific rules “screen for truth”. These methodological 
considerations require a metaphysical grounding. Following Rescher’s methodological 
pragmatism and Kornblith’s naturalistic account of induction and natural kinds, 
Sankey firmly grounds his metaphysical considerations in the principles of uniformity 
of nature and the existence of real kinds in nature. Both approaches frame methodo-
logical success within a broader metaphysical context involving a commitment to an 
objective, mind-independent reality which is highly consonant with realism. 
 Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science rewards the epistemic optimist with a 
compelling and thought-provoking account of scientific realism. Sankey places realism 
at the centre of contemporary philosophical debate, and does so with incisive and bal-
anced arguments. One concern about the book is perhaps the lack of a tight connec-
tion with the history of science ― a fault that is common to much contemporary phi-
losophy of science. Despite this, Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science will provide 
academics and students with a challenging defence of scientific realism that will set the 
agenda for future debate.  
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